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Abstract. In this paper, we provide an axiomatic characterization of social welfare
functions for uncertain incomes. Our most general result is that a small number of
reasonable assumptions regarding welfare orderings under uncertainty rule out pure
ex ante as well as pure ex post evaluations. Any social welfare function that satis¯es
these axioms should lie strictly between the ex ante and the ex post evaluations of
income distributions. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the weighted
average of the minimum and the maximum of ex post and the ex ante evaluations.
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Consider a society divided into two sectors of equal size { say, sector A and sector B.
Sector A corresponds to domestic services that cannot be traded at the international
level while sector B corresponds to manufacturing industries that can be traded.
The government decides if international trade is allowed or not. If no international
trade is permitted, whatever happens, wages remain equal to $1000 a month in both
sectors. In contrast, if international trade is allowed, wages in sector B depend on an
exogeneous shock on international demand, which can be positive or negative, with
unknown probabilities. If the shock is positive, wages in sector B are $1500 a month,
whereas if the shock is negative, wages are only $600 a month. In other words, trade
is assumed to increase simultaneously total income, inequality and uncertainty. The
two possible policies can be represented by the following tables.
no trade sector A sector B
shock > 0 1000 1000
shock < 0 1000 1000
trade sector A sector B
shock > 0 1000 1500
shock < 0 1000 600
The government must decide whether or not to allow international trade. Clearly,
the policy which should be chosen depends on the inequality and uncertainty aver-
sions that characterize this particular society. The optimal policy, however, also
depends on when individuals' welfare is evaluated, namely before (ex ante) or after
(ex post) the resolution of uncertainty. For su±ciently low risk aversion, trade is
certainly the best policy ex ante, since it increases the expected earnings in sector
B without decreasing them in sector A. On the other hand, for su±ciently high in-
equality aversion, trade is also no doubt the worst policy ex post, since it decreases
the lowest wages during bad periods, without increasing them during favorable pe-
riods.
More generally, when comparing uncertain income distributions, should we look
at the expected income of each person, and consider that the distribution where
the inequality of expected incomes is the lowest as the best one? Or should we
look at the level of inequalities associated to each possible state of the world, and
consider the distribution where the expected level of inequality is the lowest as the
best solution?
This problem is not new and has sometimes been labelled as the \timing-e®ect
problem": the outcome of an allocation procedure depends on whether individuals'
utility levels are evaluated before or after the resolution of uncertainty.2 As stated
by Myerson,
\The moral of this story is that simply specifying a social welfare
function may not be enough to fully determine a procedure for collective
2See for instance Broome (1984), Diamond (1967), Myerson (1981) and Hammond (1981),
among others, for theoretical work on the timing e®ect. See Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) for empirical
evidence about the importance of beliefs in distributional issues.
1decision making. One must also specify when the individuals' preferences
or utility levels should be evaluated; before or after the resolution of un-
certainties. The timing of social welfare analysis may make a di®erence.
The timing-e®ect is often an issue in moral debate, as when people argue
about whether a social system should be judged with respects to its ac-
tual income distribution or with respect to its distribution of economic
opportunities" (p. 884).
To the best of our knowledge, the principles that should be followed to answer
this question have not yet been identi¯ed in the economic literature. Whereas an
extensive body of literature exists on inequality measurement when no uncertainty is
involved, very little has been written on inequality measurement under uncertainty,
with the important exception of Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997).
As stated by Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997), the crucial issue for
measuring inequality under uncertainty is to simultaneously take into account the
inequality of expected incomes and the expected inequalities of actual incomes. In
this paper, we propose a simple axiomatic characterization of social welfare rankings
under uncertainty that captures these two dimensions.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 introduces notation and
provides an axiomatic characterization of social welfare functions under uncertainty.
Our most general result is that a small number of reasonable assumptions regarding
welfare orderings under uncertainty rule out pure ex ante and pure ex post evalua-
tions. Any social welfare function that satis¯es these axioms should remain strictly
between the ex ante and the ex post evaluations of income distributions. Section
3 provides a reasonable strengthening of our basic axioms which leads to a more
complete characterization of admissible social welfare functions. In Section 4, we
analyze how the set of welfare functions axiomatized in this paper compares with the
family of min-of-means functionals introduced by Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1997). Finally, Section 5 gives our conclusions. All the proofs are gathered in
the appendix.
2. A General Class of Social Preferences Under Uncertainty
In order to better understand the di±culties raised by uncertainty in evaluating
income distributions, let us examine the canonical examples given by Ben Porath,
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997). Consider a society with two individuals, a and b,
facing two equally likely possible states of the world, s and t, and assume that the










As argued by Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997), P2 and P3 are ex post
equivalents, since in both cases, whatever the state of the world, the ¯nal income
2distribution is (0;1) (or (1;0) which, assuming anonymity, is equivalent). On the
other hand, P3 gives 1 for sure to one individual, and 0 to the other, while P2 provides
both individuals with the same ex ante income prospects. On these grounds, for a
su±ciently low level of uncertainty aversion, it is reasonable to think that P2 should
be ranked above P3. As for P1, on the other hand, both individuals face the same
income prospects like in P2; but in P1, there is no ex post inequality, whatever the
state of the world. This could lead one to prefer P1 over P2.3
This example makes clear that there is no hope for providing a reasonable social
welfare function over income distributions under uncertainty by simply reducing the
problem under consideration to a problem of a choice over uncertain aggregated
incomes (say, e.g., by computing a traditional social welfare function µ a la Atkinson-
Kolm-Sen in each state, and then reducing the problem to a single decision maker's
choice among prospects of welfare). Similarly, reducing the problem by ¯rst aggre-
gating individuals' income prospects, and then considering a classical social welfare
function de¯ned on these aggregated incomes would not be a reasonable solution.
The ¯rst procedure would lead us to neglect ex ante considerations and to judge P2
and P3 as equivalent. In contrast, the second procedure would lead us to neglect
ex post considerations and to see P1 and P2 as equivalent. In other words, these
procedures would fail to simultaneously take into account the ex ante and the ex
post income distributions.
Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997) suggest solving this problem by con-
sidering a linear combination of the two procedures described above, i.e., a linear
combination of the expected Gini index and the Gini index of expected income. This
solution captures both ex ante and ex post inequalities. Furthermore, it is a natu-
ral generalization of the principles commonly used for evaluating inequality under
certainty on the one hand, and for decision making under uncertainty on the other
hand. However, the procedure suggested by Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1997) is not the only possible evaluation principle that takes into account both ex
ante and ex post inequalities. Any functional that is increasing in both individuals'
expected income and snapshot inequalities (say, measured by the Gini index) has
the same nice property, provided that it takes its values between the expected Gini
and the Gini of the expectation. Furthermore, it is unclear why we should restrict
ourselves, as Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997) did, to decision makers who
behave in accordance with the multiple priors model.4
There is hence a need for an axiomatic characterization of inequality measure-
ment under uncertainty, which can encompass the Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmei-
dler's (1997) proposal, and make clear why this speci¯c functional should be used.
In this section, we propose a set of axioms which capture what we think to be the
3As in Gilboa, Ben Porath and Schmeidler (1997), we consider preferences over ¯nal allocations:
we do not claim that one could not obtain a policy that is strictly preferred to P1 by way of ex
post transfers among individuals in P2.
4The multiple priors model assumes that social preferences are concave. It is unclear why
preferences over uncertain outcomes should necessarily be concave.
3basic requirements for any reasonable evaluation of welfare under uncertainty, and
identify the corresponding general class of preferences.
2.1. Notation
Let S = f1;:::;sg and K = f1;:::;ng be respectively a ¯nite set of states of the
world, and a ¯nite set of individuals. Let F denote the set of non-negative real-
valued functions on S£K. An element f of F corresponds to a (s£n) non-negative
real-valued matrix. For every k ¸ 0, we will denote by k the (s£n) matrix with all
entries equal to k.
In this paper, we interpret F as a set of income distributions under uncertainty.
For each f in F, f¾i denotes i's income if state ¾ occurs, while f¾¢ is the row
vector that represents the income distribution in state ¾, and f¢i the column vector
that represents individual i's income pro¯le. Furthermore, f¾¢ denotes the (s £ n)
matrix with all rows equal to f¾¢, whereas f¢i denotes the (s £ n) matrix with all
columns equal to f¢i. The set of f¾¢ matrices represents situations where there is no
uncertainty: the income distribution is the same in each possible state of the world.
In contrast, the f¢i matrices characterize situations where there is no inequality: each
individual is faced with the same income prospects.
In the sequel, we adopt the following convention: vectors of Rn
+ and Rn+s
+ are
considered as row vectors, whereas vectors of Rs
+ are considered as column vectors.
For (x1;:::;xp);(y1;:::;yp) 2 Rp, (x1;:::;xp) > (y1;:::;yp) means that xi ¸ yi for
all i, and there exists at least one j such that xj > yj.
Finally, we use the following de¯nitions. A function Á : Rq ! R, with q 2 N, is
increasing if for all x;y 2 Rq, x > y implies Á(x) > Á(y). We say that Á is homoge-
neous if, for all µ > 0, and all x 2 Rq, Á(µx) = µÁ(x). We say that Á is homogeneous
of degree 0 if for all µ > 0, and all x 2 Rq, Á(µx) = Á(x). We say that Á is a±ne if,
for all x 2 Rq, all µ > 0 and all ´ 2 R, Á(µx+´1q) = µÁ(x)+´, where 1q denotes the
unit vector in Rq. We say that Á is a similarity transformation if there exists µ > 0
such that Á(x) = µx for all x 2 Rq. Finally, if Á : A ! BÁ and Ã : A ! BÃ are two
functions, =(Á;Ã) = f(x;y) 2 BÁ £ BÃ j9z 2 A s.t. Á(z) = x and Ã(z) = yg.
Following the literature on inequality measurement (see, e.g., Atkinson (1970),
Kolm (1976) and Sen (1973)), we do not make any assumptions about individuals'
preferences. The issue is not to aggregate individuals' preferences, but to propose
principles for de¯ning a reasonable collective attitude towards inequality under un-
certainty.
2.2. The structure of social welfare preferences under uncer-
tainty
We assume that there is a complete, continuous preorder on F. This is the usual
basic axiom in the ¯eld of normative inequality measurement.
Axiom 1. (ORD) There is a complete, continuous preorder on F, denoted as º.
4The preorder º can be interpreted as the decision maker's preference relation over
F (one can see this \decision maker" as anybody behind the veil of ignorance). As
usual, » and Â will stand for the symmetric and asymmetric part of º, respectively.
Within this framework, we are now going to introduce four axioms which in our
view, should be satis¯ed by any plausible social preference over uncertain income
distributions.
The ¯rst axiom is a standard monotonicity requirement: if f provides each
individual with a higher income than g in each state of the world, then f should be
preferred to g.
Axiom 2. (MON) For all f;g in F, if f¾i > g¾i for all ¾ in S and all i in K, then
f Â g.
Any preorder º on F naturally induces two preorders ºa and ºp on Rs
+ and Rn
+
respectively, de¯ned as: f¢i ºa g¢i if and only if f¢i º g¢i, and f¾¢ ºp g¾¢ if and only if
f¾¢ º g¾¢. The preorder ºp captures the decision maker's preferences in the absence
of uncertainty, i.e., when the income distribution does not depend on the state of
the world. In contrast, ºa captures the decision maker's preferences in the absence
of inequality, i.e., when each individual faces the same income prospects. In other
words ºa and ºp represent preorders on individual income pro¯les and snapshot
income distributions, respectively.
Let us assume that f and g are such that (a) f¾¢ is preferred to g¾¢ for all ¾ (with
respect to ºp), and (b) f¢i is preferred to g¢i for all i (with respect to ºa). In other
words, f is preferred to g ex post regardless of the state of the world and f is also
preferred to g ex ante regardless of the individual on which we focus. In such a case,
it is reasonable to assume that f is preferred to g with respect to º. This property
corresponds to the following axiom of dominance.
Axiom 3. (DOM) Let f;g 2 F. If for all ¾ 2 S, f¾¢ ºp g¾¢, and for all i 2 K,
f¢i ºa g¢i, then f º g. If, moreover, there exists ¾ 2 S or i 2 K such that f¾¢ Âp g¾¢
or f¢i Âa g¢i, then f Â g.
(DOM) should not be understood as providing a rule for aggregating individuals'
preferences. By construction, ºa does not represent individuals' preferences but
the collective attitude towards uncertainty, exactly as ºp represents the collective
attitude towards inequality. When these principles imply that (a) any individual is
better o® in f than in g, and (b) any snapshot distribution of f is better than the
corresponding snapshot distribution in g, then (ADOM) simply requires the decision
maker to prefer f to g.
Now, let us assume that the uncertain income f¾i of individual i in state ¾ can
be represented as the combination of individual ¯xed e®ects that do not depend on
the state of the nature, captured by ¸i, on the one hand, and e®ects that depend
on the state of the nature ¹¾, but that are the same for all individuals, on the other
hand. In other words, f¾i = ¸i¹¾, for all i 2 K and all ¾ 2 S. In such a case,
we can reasonably focus on preorders which satisfy the following property: if the
5distribution of individual (sure) ¯xed e®ects is the same for two matrices f and g,
but the random variable that generates the variability of individuals' income across
states of nature in f is preferred (with respect to ºa) to the one that generates the
variability of the individuals' income across states of nature in g, then f is preferred
to g. This requirement is formally stated in the following Conditional Dominance
Axiom.
Axiom 4. (CDOM) 8¸ 2 Rn
+; ¸ 6= 0; ¹;º 2 Rs
+; ¹¸ º º¸ , ¹ ºa º.
Lastly, we will require that º be homogeneous. This axiom is of course debatable;
however, this assumption is quite standard in the ¯eld of inequality measurement.5
Axiom 5. (HOM) 8f;g 2 F; 8µ > 0;f º g , µf º µg.
The following Lemma will prove to be useful in the sequel.
Lemma 1. Assume Axioms (ORD), (MON), (CDOM) and (HOM) hold. There
then exist a homogeneous function I which represents º, and two homogeneous
functions Ia and Ip which represent ºa and ºp, respectively, such that:
8¹ 2 R
s
+; ¸ 2 R
n
+; I(¹¸) = Ia(¹)Ip(¸):
Our ¯rst basic ¯nding is that any homogeneous continuous complete social evalu-
ation of the elements of F that satis¯es the dominance and monotonicity axioms in-
troduced in this section should necessarily remain between two very crucial bounds,
namely the evaluation of social welfare distribution before the resolution of un-
certainties and the evaluation of social welfare distribution after the resolution of
uncertainty. In order to state this result, we will need the following notation. Af-
ter Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997), for all f in F , and any function
Ia : Rs
+ ! R+ and Ip : Rn
+ ! R+, we will denote by (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) the iterative
application of Ia to the results of Ip applied to the rows of f, and by (Ip ¤Ia)(f) the
iterative application of Ip to the results of Ia applied to the columns of f. (Ia¤Ip) is
hence obtained by ¯rst evaluating social welfare in each possible state of the world
(through Ip), and then evaluating the distribution of these welfares through Ia. On
the other hand, (Ip¤Ia) is obtained by ¯rst evaluating each individual's welfare by Ia,
and then computing through Ip the social value of the distribution of these individ-
ual welfares. Formally, we use the following notation: Ia(f) = (Ia(f¢1);:::;Ia(f¢n)),
Ip(f) = (Ip(f1¢);:::;Ip(fs¢)), and (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) = Ia(Ip(f)), (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) = Ip(Ia(f)).
This is a slight abuse in notation, but there is no risk of confusion between Ia(f¢i)
(Ip(f¾¢)), which is a function from Rs
+ (Rn
+) to R+, and Ia (Ip), which is a function
from F to Rn
+ (Rs
+). Our result then reads as follows.
5Homogeneity is a potentially problematic property when there is a positive minimum of sub-
sistance.
6Theorem 1. Axioms (ORD), (MON), (DOM) (CDOM) and (HOM) are satis¯ed if,
and only if, there exist a continuous, increasing, homogeneous function I : F ! R+
which represents º, two continuous, increasing and homogeneous functions Ia :
Rs
+ ! R+ and Ip : Rn
+ ! R+, which represent ºa and ºp, respectively, and a
continuous, increasing and homogeneous function ª : =(Ip;Ia) ! R+, such that the
following hold:
1. 8f;g 2 F, f º g , I(f) = ª(Ip(f);Ia(f)) ¸ ª(Ip(g);Ia(g)) = I(g)
2. If (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) = (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) then I(f) = ª(Ip(f);Ia(f)) = (Ia ¤ Ip)(f)
3. If (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) 6= (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) then:
minf(Ia ¤ Ip)(f);(Ip ¤ Ia)(f)g < I(f) < maxf(Ia ¤ Ip)(f);(Ip ¤ Ia)(f)g:
Moreover, ª is unique given Ia and Ip, and Ia and Ip are each unique up to a
similarity transformation.
The symmetry of the representation theorem might at ¯rst sight seem surprising,
since Axiom (CDOM) is not symmetric. However, once homogeneity is assumed,
(CDOM) implies its symmetric counterpart, as Lemma 1 clearly shows. This is
stated formally in the following remark.
Remark 1. Axioms (ORD), (CDOM) and (HOM) imply that for all ¸; ^ ¸ 2 Rn
+; ¹ 2
Rs
+; ¹ 6= 0; ¹¸ º ¹^ ¸ , ¸ ºp ^ ¸
The Ia function represents ºa and re°ects how the decision maker evaluates
uncertain income pro¯les. Symmetrically, the Ip function represents ºp and captures
how the decision maker evaluates income distribution under certainty. Within this
framework, (Ia¤Ip) represents the evaluation through Ia of the distribution of ex post
social welfares, while (Ip¤Ia) represents the evaluation through Ip of the distribution
of ex ante social welfares. These two functionals represent the two key dimensions of
social welfare under uncertainty, namely, unequal uncertainties (Ip¤Ia) and uncertain
inequalities (Ia ¤ Ip). The ¯rst one re°ects ex post considerations while the second
one only captures ex ante considerations. Theorem 1 shows that under plausible
monotonicity and dominance assumptions, a continuous and homogeneous social
evaluation cannot correspond to (Ip ¤ Ia) or (Ia ¤ Ip); but should necessarily remain
strictly between these two bounds.
The social welfare functionals de¯ned in Theorem 1 are such that for every f,
I(f) is a speci¯c weighted-average of the iterative application of Ip to the results
of Ia and of the iterative application of Ia to the results of Ip.6 This motivates the
following de¯nition of Weighted Cross-Iterative (WCI) functionals.
6To be more speci¯c, for each f, there exists °(f) in (0;1), such that I(f) = °(f)(Ip ¤Ia)(f)+
(1 ¡ °(f))(Ia ¤ Ip)(f):
7De¯nition. A continuous functional I : F ! R+ is a Weighted Cross-Iterative
(WCI) functional, if and only if, there exist two continuous, increasing and homo-
geneous functions Ia : Rs
+ ! R+ and Ip : Rn
+ ! R+, a function ° : F ! (0;1)
homogeneous of degree 0, such that the following hold:
(i) 8f 2 F, I(f) = °(f)(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + (1 ¡ °(f))(Ia ¤ Ip)(f)
(ii) 8f;g 2 F, (Ia(f);Ip(f)) > (Ia(f);Ip(g)) ) I(f) > I(g):
We denote W as the set of WCI functionals.
Using De¯nition 1, Theorem 1 can be restated as follows.
Theorem 2. Axioms (ORD), (MON), (DOM), (CDOM) and (HOM) are satis¯ed
if, and only if, º can be represented by I 2 W, with Ia and Ip representing ºa and
ºp, respectively. Moreover, Ia and Ip are unique up to a similarity transformation,
and °jff2Fj(Ia¤Ip)(f)6=(Ip¤Ia)(f)g is unique.
Note that the functionals proposed by Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997),
namely I(f) = ®(Gp ¤ Ea)(f) + (1 ¡ ®)(Ea ¤ Gp)(f), where Ea is the expectation
(de¯ned on Rs
+) and Gp is a Gini functional (de¯ned on Rn
+), belong to W. Of
course, the class of WCI functionals is much larger, since WCI functionals do not
necessarily give constant weights to uncertainty in social welfare, on the one hand,
and to inequality in uncertain income pro¯les, on the other hand. Actually, the most
striking feature of the functionals proposed by Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1997) is precisely that these relative weights do not depend on the matrix f under
consideration (they are always given by the same ® and (1 ¡ ®)).
Interestingly, Theorem 1 can be used to derive a very fundamental partial order-
ing over distributions of income under uncertainty: for any f;g 2 F, if
maxf(Ia ¤ Ip)(f);(Ip ¤ Ia)(f)g · minf(Ia ¤ Ip)(g);(Ip ¤ Ia)(g)g;
then g º f. If f exhibits both less uncertainty in social welfare and less inequality
in uncertain pro¯les than g, then it should be preferred to g.
This result provides a very simple means for ranking a wide range of distributions
of income under uncertainty. For instance, consider the three social policies P1, P2
and P3 de¯ned at the beginning of this section. For the sake of simplicity, assume
that Ia and Ip are symmetric.7 Then, if Ip(1;1) = Ia(1;1) = 1 (which is only a matter
of normalization), we can easily check that (Ia ¤ Ip)(P1) = (Ip ¤ Ia)(P2) = Ia(0;1),
(Ia ¤ Ip)(P3) = (Ip ¤ Ia)(P3) = Ip(0;1), (Ia ¤ Ip)(P2) = Ip(0;1) and (Ip ¤ Ia)(P1) =
Ia(0;1). Therefore, only three cases are possible: P1 Â P2 Â P3, P3 Â P2 Â P1 or
P1 » P2 » P3. Which of these orderings holds depends on the relative weight of
the inequality and uncertainty aversions. If we assume that Ia is the expectation,
and Ip the Gini index, we get P1 Â P2 Â P3. This is so because the expectation is
neutral towards risk.
7The symmetry of Ip can be seen as a requirement of impartiality, whereas the symmetry of Ia
can be justi¯ed, in this example, when the two states are equally likely.
83. Weighted Cross-Iterative Functionals
In this section, we show that a reasonable strengthening of the requirements in-
troduced in the previous section makes it possible to characterize interesting and
easy-to-implement sub-classes within the set of WCI functionals. Therefore, here-
after, we assume that º can be represented by a WCI functional.
First, we are going to focus on WCI functionals that satisfy the following strength-
ening of (DOM), to which we refer to as an Average Dominance Axiom.8
Axiom 6. (ADOM) 8f;g 2 F, if (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¸ (Ia ¤ Ip)(g) and (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¸
(Ip ¤ Ia)(g) then I(f) ¸ I(g).
This Axiom corresponds to requirements that are clearly stronger than (DOM).
Under (ADOM), we do not require uniform ex ante and ex post dominance to prefer
f to g, but only average dominance. Axiom (ADOM) can be seen as an axiom that
imposes some consistency in the principles that rule ex post and ex ante welfare
evaluations. To compare two matrices from an ex post viewpoint, we must ¯rst
evaluate each possible income distribution and then, in a second stage, compare the
two sets of social welfare evaluations. Symmetrically, to compare two matrices from
an ex ante viewpoint, we must ¯rst evaluate income pro¯les for each individual, and
then, in a second stage, compare the two distributions of income pro¯le evaluations.
In a sense, axiom (ADOM) says that the principles that rule the ¯rst stage of the
ex post comparison should be the same as those which rule the second stage of the
ex ante comparison, and vice versa. To put it di®erently, since each possible income
distribution is evaluated through Ip, the distribution of income pro¯les should also
be evaluated through Ip. Symmetrically, since each individual's income pro¯le is
evaluated through Ia, the social welfare evaluation pro¯les should also be evaluated
through Ia.
In addition to axiom (ADOM), we will require º to be additive, meaning that
adding the same intercept to two matrices does not modify their ranking.
Axiom 7. (ADD) For all f;g 2 F, ´ 2 R+, f º g ) f + ´1 º g + ´1.
This is a standard assumption regarding social welfare orderings. We could have
introduced (ADD) earlier in the text. To be more speci¯c, we could have introduced
(ADD) instead of (HOM) in the previous section: substituting (ADD) for (HOM)
in the list of axioms used in theorem 1 leads to the same general class of social
preferences (where homogeneity is replaced by unit translatability).
The following theorem characterizes WCI functionals which satisfy (ADOM) and
(ADD).
Theorem 3. Suppose that º can be represented by a WCI functional I. Then º
satis¯es Axioms (ADOM) and (ADD) if, and only if, Ia and Ip are a±ne, and there
8Note that for any WCI functional, I, Ia and Ip are well-de¯ned.
9exist ®;¯ 2 (0;1), such that:
I(f) =
(
®(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + (1 ¡ ®)(Ia ¤ Ip)(f); if (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¸ (Ip ¤ Ia)(f)
¯ (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + (1 ¡ ¯)(Ia ¤ Ip)(f); if (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¸ (Ia ¤ Ip)(f):
Moreover, ® and ¯ are unique.
The set of such I is denoted W1. Once (ADOM) and (ADD) are satis¯ed,
the weight given to ex ante evaluations only depends on whether they are more
important or less important than ex post ones, and vice versa.
Axiom (ADOM) can be strengthened by assuming that the two fundamental
dimensions of welfare, namely inequality in uncertainties and uncertainty in in-
equalities are of commensurate value and equally important. The following axiom
of Global Dominance requires that if the best dimension of a matrix f is better than
the best dimension of a matrix g, and the worst dimension of f is also better than
the worst dimension of g, then f is better than g.
Axiom 8. (GDOM) For all f;g in F, if
(
maxf(Ia ¤ Ip)(f);(Ip ¤ Ia)(f)g ¸ maxf(Ia ¤ Ip)(g);(Ip ¤ Ia)(g)g
minf(Ia ¤ Ip)(f);(Ip ¤ Ia)(f)g ¸ minf(Ia ¤ Ip)(g);(Ip ¤ Ia)(g)g
then, I(f) ¸ I(g).
Note that when (GDOM) is satis¯ed, (ADOM) is also satis¯ed.
Replacing Axiom (ADOM) by Axiom (GDOM) in Theorem 3 leads to the char-
acterization of the Weighted Max-Min functionals, i.e., of WCI functionals that can
be written as a weighted average of the maximum and the minimum of (Ip ¤ Ia)(f)
and (Ia ¤ Ip)(f).
Theorem 4. Suppose that º can be represented by a WCI functional I. Then º
satis¯es Axioms (GDOM) and (ADD) if, and only if, Ia and Ip are a±ne and there
exists ± 2 (0;1), such that:
I(f) = ± minf(Ia ¤ Ip)(f);(Ip ¤ Ia)(f)g + (1 ¡ ±)maxf(Ia ¤ Ip)(f);(Ip ¤ Ia)(f)g:
Moreover, ± is unique.
The set of such I is denoted as W2. Once (GDOM) is satis¯ed, the weights put
on the two possible welfare evaluations do not depend on whether they correspond
to ex post or ex ante considerations, but only on whether they are the most or the
least important. Observe that we have W2 ½ W1 ½ W.
104. Weighted Cross-Iterative Functionals and Ben-Porath, Gilboa,
Schmeidler's proposal
As noted above, Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997) have proposed a speci¯c
sub-class of WCI functionals, namely the functionals that can be written as I(f) =
®(Ip ¤Ia)(f)+(1¡®)(Ia ¤Ip)(f), where Ia and Ip are what they call min-of-means
functionals.
Min-of-means functionals are well-known in decision theory under the name of
the multiple priors model, and were ¯rst introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989). Special notation is needed in order to de¯ne these functionals. Let PK
and PS be the spaces of probability vectors on K and S, respectively. For any
f¾¢ 2 Rn
+ and q 2 PK, let q ¢ f¾¢ =
P
i qif¾i. Similarly, for any f¢i 2 Rs
+, and q 2 PS,
let q ¢ f¢i =
P
¾ q¾f¾i. Min-of-means functionals are de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition. A functional Ia : Rs
+ ! R+ (Ip : Rn
+ ! R+) is a min-of-means func-
tional if, and only if, there exists a compact and convex subset CIa (CIp) of PS (PK
), such that for all f¢i 2 Rs
+ (f¾¢ 2 Rn
+), Ia(f¢i) = min
q2CIa
q ¢ f¢i (Ip(f¾¢) = min
q2CIp
q ¢ f¾¢).
The class of functionals W3 proposed by Ben-Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler can
then be de¯ned as:
W3 = fI 2 W jIa;Ip are min-of-means functionals and 8f;g 2 F; °(f) = °(g)g
Any functional in W3 clearly belongs to W1, meaning W3 ½ W1: In contrast, elements
of W3 do not necessarily satisfy (GDOM), and there exist functionals in W3 which
do not belong to W2 (i.e., W3 6½ W2):
Any I in W3 gives the same weight to ex ante inequalities regardless of whether
they are more or less important than ex post ones and vice versa. In contrast, any
I in W2 systematically puts more emphasis on the dominant source of inequality.
Before exploring the relationship between these two classes of functionals, it may
be useful to de¯ne a special subset of the set of min-of-means functionals, namely the
generalized minimum operators. We say that a min-of-means functional Ia : Rs
+ !
R+ is a generalized minimum operator if there exist k 2 S and S0 = f¾1;:::;¾kg µ S
such that for all ¹ = (¹1;:::;¹s) 2 Rs
+, Ia(¹) = min¾2S0 ¹¾. Similarly, Ip : Rn
+ ! R+
is a generalized minimum operator if there exist k 2 K and K0 = fi1;:::;ikg µ K
such that for all ¸ = (¸1;:::;¸n) 2 Rn
+, Ip(¸) = mini2K0 ¸i.
The following theorem examines the conditions under which an element of W3
satis¯es the axioms introduced in this paper and belongs to W2.
Theorem 5. Assume I 2 W3. Then, I 2 W2 if and only if at least one of the two
following conditions is satis¯ed:
(i) 8f 2 F, I(f) = 1
2(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + 1
2(Ia ¤ Ip)(f)
(ii) Ia or Ip are either a mathematical expectation with respects to a given probability
measure, or a generalized minimum operator.
11A potentially interesting subclass of W3 is the set of symmetric min-of-means
(i.e., such that for all f 2 F, I(f) = I(f0) for all f0 such that f0 is obtained by
a permutation of the rows and the columns of f). The symmetry assumption may
be relevant whenever the states of the world are equally likely. Given that the
only symmetric generalized minimum operator is the minimum operator (on all the
components) and that the only symmetric probability vector is the uniform one (i.e.,
the vector whose all components are equal), Theorem 5 has the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume I 2 W3 and I symmetric. Then I 2 W2 if and only if at
least one of the two following conditions is satis¯ed:
(i) 8f 2 F, I(f) = 1
2(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + 1
2(Ia ¤ Ip)(f)
(ii) Ia or Ip are either the mathematical expectation with respect to the uniform
distribution, or the minimum operator.
Generally speaking, once we exclude the speci¯c cases of risk (or inequality) neu-
trality and extreme egalitarianism (or extreme aversion to risk), the only functionals
that belong simultaneously to W2 and W3 are the arithmetic means of ex ante and
ex post social welfare evaluation (through min-of-means). The key feature of these
functionals is that any given shifts in ex post levels of social welfare can actually be
compensated by symmetric shifts in ex ante levels of individuals' welfare, i.e., by
shifts whose social evaluation is the same as the evaluation of the ex post shifts in
absolute value.
To make this property explicit, let us de¯ne, for each vector u in Rn
+, the set
S(u) of vectors v of Rs
+, such that for some constant k > 0, the matrix u¾¢ +k with
all rows equal to u + k1n (i.e., a matrix with no uncertainty, where only inequality
matters) is equivalent to the matrix v¢i + k with all columns equal to v + k 1s (i.e.,
a matrix with no inequality, where only uncertainty matters). 9 Formally:
S(u) = fv 2 R
s j9k > 0; s.t. v¢i + k » u¾¢ + kg:
Then, for any matrix f 2 F, one can de¯ne the set E(f) µ F of matrices that are
obtained from f by shifts in ex post levels of social welfare and shifts in ex ante
levels of individuals' welfare, whose social evaluations are the same. Formally,
E(f) = fg 2 F j9u 2 R
n; v 2 S(u); s.t. (Ia(g);Ip(g)) = (Ia(f) ¡ u;Ip(f) + v)g:
We can now state formally the desired Axiom of symmetry.
Axiom 9. (SYM) 8f 2 F; g 2 E(f) ) f » g:
As it turns out, the preorder º can be represented by a WCI functional and
satis¯es Axioms (ADD) and (SYM) if, and only if, it can be represented by the
arithmetic mean of ex ante and ex post welfare evaluations.
9We denote by k¾¢ the vector of Rn
+ with all entries equal to k, and by k¢i the vector of Rs
+ with
all entries equal to k.
12Theorem 6. Suppose that º can be represented by a WCI functional I. Then º









In this paper, we show that under some reasonable monotonicity and dominance
assumptions, any continuous homogeneous social welfare function should lie strictly
between the ex ante and the ex post evaluations of income distributions. We propose
the weighted average of the minimum and the maximum of ex post and ex ante
evaluations as a new means for evaluating welfare under uncertainty.
Clearly, this new evaluation tool can be used in a potentially very large set of
contexts. The usual practice is to rank public policies according to their impact on
either the observed distribution of income or on the distribution of expected income.
Once we do not neglect macroeconomic uncertainty, we should not rely on either
pure ex ante or pure ex post considerations, but on one of the mixtures that are
axiomatized in this paper.
At a very general level, our paper can be understood as an attempt to evaluate
income distributions when it is not indi®erent whether income varies across states
of the world or across individuals. We think that this approach could be generalized
to any problem of welfare evaluation where the sources of income variability mat-
ter. One such problem is the evaluation of income distributions according to the
principle of equality of opportunity. This principle requires giving di®erent weights
to inequalities generated by circumstances beyond the control of individuals on the
one hand, and on the other hand, to inequalities generated by actions that re°ect
individuals' own free volition. We speculate that the axiomatization and design of
new means for implementing this principle can be obtained following a very similar
route as the one used in this paper. This issue is part of our research agenda.
13Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
By Debreu (1959), Axiom (ORD) implies that there exists a continuous function
I : F ! R representing º. We can, therefore, de¯ne Ia and Ip, representing ºa
and ºp, respectively, as follows: Ia(f¢i) = I(f¢i), and Ip(f¾¢) = I(f¾¢), for all f¢i 2 Rs
+
and f¾¢ 2 Rn
+. Furthermore, we can, without loss of generality, normalize I such
that I(1) = 1, where 1 is the matrix in F whose elements are all equal to 1. Axiom
(HOM) implies that I can be chosen to be homogeneous, from which it follows that
Ia and Ip are homogeneous too. Moreover, by continuity of I, I(0) = 0. Therefore,
by Axiom (MON), I(f) ¸ 0 for all f in F. This obviously implies that Ia(¹) ¸ 0
for all ¹ 2 Rs
+, and Ip(¸) ¸ 0 for all ¸ 2 Rn
+.
Let f = ¹¸ 2 F, with ¹ 2 Rs
+ and ¸ 2 Rn
+, ¸ 6= 0. De¯ne g by: g¾i = Ia(¹)¸i,
for all ¾ 2 S and all i 2 K. Observe that g = º¸, with º = (Ia(¹);:::;Ia(¹)) 2
Rs
+. By homogeneity of Ia, and given the normalization choice I(1) = 1, we have:
Ia(º) = Ia(¹). Therefore, by Axiom (CDOM), we have f » g, i.e., I(f) = I(g).
But, by homogeneity of I, I(g) = Ia(¹)I(h¾¢), with h¾¢ = ¸ for every ¾. Since, by
de¯nition of Ip, I(h¾¢) = Ip(¸), we get: I(g) = Ia(¹)Ip(¸) = I(f), the desired result.
¥
Proof of Theorem 1.
First, we prove the \only if" part of the Theorem.
Claim 1. Axioms (ORD), (MON), (DOM) and (HOM) imply that there exist a
continuous, increasing, homogeneous function I which represents º, two continu-
ous, increasing and homogeneous functions Ia : Rs
+ ! R+ and Ip : Rn
+ ! R+,
which represent ºa and ºp, respectively, a continuous, increasing and homogeneous
function ª : =(Ip;Ia) ! R+, such that 8f;g 2 F:
f º g , I(f) = ª(Ip(f);Ia(f)) ¸ ª(Ip(g);Ia(g)) = I(g):
Proof.
By Debreu (1959), Axiom (ORD) holds if, and only if, there exists a continuous
function I : F ! R such that I represents º. Furthermore, Axiom (MON) implies
that I is increasing.
Without loss of generality, we can choose I such that I(1) = 1. Axiom (HOM)
implies that I can be chosen homogeneous, i.e., such that I(µf) = µI(f) for all
µ > 0 and f 2 F. The homogeneity and the continuity of I imply that I(0) = 0.
Therefore, by Axiom (MON), I(f) ¸ 0 for all f in F, i.e., I takes its values in R+:
Considering the restriction of I on sets of matrices f¾¢ and f¢i respectively, Axiom
(ORD) implies that there exist two non negative continuous functions Ip and Ia
representing ºp and ºa respectively, and that these functions are increasing and
homogeneous, since I is.
14Now, for any x 2 =(Ip;Ia), let ¡(x) = ff 2 F j(Ip(f);Ia(f)) = xg.10 Axiom
(DOM) implies that if two matrices f and g are such that Ip(f) = Ip(g) and Ia(f) =
Ia(g), then f » g, and therefore I(f) = I(g). Hence, for all x 2 =(Ip;Ia), and all
f;g 2 ¡(x), I(f) = I(g). Now de¯ne ª : =(Ip;Ia) ! R+ by: ª(x) = I(f)jf2¡(x).
For any f 2 F, I(f) = ª(Ip(f);Ia(f)).
Using (DOM) and the fact that Ia and Ip are homogenous, it is straightforward
to show that ª is homogenous and increasing too. We now prove the continuity of
ª. Let x(k) 2 =(Ip;Ia), be a sequence such that limk!1 x(k) = x 2 =(Ip;Ia). We









for all k, and f 2 ¡(x). Given
that limk!1 x(k) = x, for any " > 0 there exists N 2 N such that, for any k > N,
(1 ¡ ")x < x
(k) < (1 + ")x:
Thus, given that Ia and Ip are homogenous, we have:
(Ip((1 ¡ ")f);Ia((1 ¡ ")f)) < (Ip(f
(k));Ia(f
(k))) < (Ip((1 + ")f);Ia((1 + ")f));
and therefore by Axiom (DOM):
I((1 ¡ ")f) < I(f
(k)) < I((1 + ")f):
Finally, homogeneity of I implies: (1¡")I(f) < I(f(k)) < (1+")I(f); which means





Claim 2. Axioms (ORD), (MON), (DOM), (CDOM) and (HOM) imply that, for
all f;g 2 F such that (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) 6= (Ip ¤ Ia)(f),
minf(Ia ¤ Ip)(f);(Ip ¤ Ia)(f)g < I(f) < maxf(Ia ¤ Ip)(f);(Ip ¤ Ia)(f)g:
Proof.





(Ip¤Ia)(f) , for all ¾ in S and all i in K.11 Observe that, since f 6= 0, Axiom
(MON) implies that g and h are well de¯ned.
First, let us assume that (Ia¤Ip)(f) < (Ip¤Ia)(f). We get: Ia(g¢i) =
Ia(f¢i)
(Ia¤Ip)(f)(Ia¤
Ip)(f) for all i in K by homogeneity of Ia. Therefore: Ia(g¢i) = Ia(f¢i) for all i in
K. On the other hand, Ip(g¾¢) =
Ip(f¾¢)
(Ia¤Ip)(f)(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) for all i in K, by homogeneity
of Ip, which implies Ip(g¾¢) > Ip(f¾¢) for all ¾ in S, since (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) < (Ip ¤ Ia)(f).
Therefore, it follows from Claim 1 that g Â f.
Observe that g = 1
(Ia¤Ip)(f)¹1¸1, with ¸1 = (Ia(f¢1);:::;Ia(f¢n)) and ¹1 = (Ip(f1¢);:::;Ip(fs¢)).
Therefore, by homogeneity of I, and using Lemma 1, we have I(g) = 1
(Ia¤Ip)(f)Ia(¹1)Ip(¸1).




+ j9f 2 F ;(Ip(f);Ia(f)) = z
ª
.
11Observe that I(0) = (Ia¤Ip)(0) = (Ip¤Ia)(0) = 0, and therefore, condition (2) of the Theorem
is obviously satis¯ed in this case.
15By de¯nition, Ia(¹1) = (Ia ¤ Ip)(f), and Ip(¸1) = (Ip ¤ Ia)(f). Therefore, I(g) =
(Ip ¤ Ia)(f), which implies: I(f) < (Ip ¤ Ia)(f).
On the other hand, Ia(h¢i) =
Ia(f¢i)
(Ip¤Ia)(f)(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) for all i in K, by homogeneity
of Ia. Therefore, Ia(h¢i) < Ia(f¢i) for all i in K since (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) < (Ip ¤ Ia)(f), and
Ip(h¾¢) =
Ip(f¾¢)
(Ip¤Ia)(f)(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) for all i in K, by homogeneity of Ip, which implies
Ip(h¾¢) = Ip(f¾¢) for all ¾ in S. Therefore, it follows from Claim 1 that f Â h.
By homogeneity of I, I(h) = 1
(Ip¤Ia)(f)I(¸1¹1). Therefore, using again Lemma 1,
we get: I(h) = (Ia ¤ Ip)(f). Therefore, I(f) > (Ia ¤ Ip)(f). From which it follows
that (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) < I(f) < (Ip ¤ Ia)(f).
Using a symmetrical argument, we can show that if (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) > (Ip ¤ Ia)(f),
then (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) < I(f) < (Ia ¤ Ip)(f). }
Claim 3. Axioms (ORD), (MON), (DOM), (CDOM) and (HOM) imply that for all
f 2 F,
(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) = (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ) I(f) = ª(Ip(f);Ia(f)) = (Ia ¤ Ip)(f)
Proof.
Assume that (Ia ¤Ip)(f) = (Ip ¤Ia)(f). Using the same notations as in Claim 2,
we clearly get that f » g » h and therefore, (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) = (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) = I(f). }
Claim 4. Ia and Ip are unique up to a similarity transformation.
Proof.
Due to the symmetry of the problem, we will focus on Ia (the proof for Ip is
similar).
Let us assume that there exist two homogeneous functionals Ia and ^ Ia that
represent ºa. Let ~ Ia =
Ia(1;:::;1)
^ Ia(1;:::;1)
^ Ia. Then, ~ Ia(1;:::;1) = Ia(1;:::;1). Assume there
exists ¹ 2 Rs
+ such that Ia(¹) 6= ~ Ia(¹). Without loss of generality, let ~ Ia(¹) = » >
Ia(¹) = ³.




Ia(1;:::;1)). By de¯nition of ~ Ia, ~ Ia(¹1) =
Ia(1;:::;1)
^ Ia(1;:::;1)
^ Ia(¹1). The homogeneity of ^ Ia then implies: ~ Ia(¹1) = ». Therefore, ¹ »a ¹1.




Ia(1;:::;1)). Using Axiom (HOM) again,
one gets Ia(¹2) = ³. Hence, ¹2 »a ¹.
Since ¹1 »a ¹ and ¹2 »a ¹, we ¯nally get ¹1 »a ¹2, which contradicts the
increasingness of ºa, since » > ³. }
We will now turn to the \if" part of the Theorem.
Axiom (ORD) is obviously satis¯ed. Since ª, Ia and Ip are homogeneous, Axiom
(HOM) is satis¯ed. Furthermore, since ª is increasing, Axiom (DOM) holds, and
since Ia and Ip are increasing, Axiom (MON) holds too.
Now, let f = ¹¸ and g = º¸ as in Axiom (CDOM), with ¹ ºa º. Homogeneity
of Ia and Ip imply Ia(f¢i) = Ia(¹)¸i for all i 2 K and Ip(f¾¢) = Ip(¸)¹¾ for all
¾ 2 S. Therefore, by homogeneity of Ia and Ip, we have (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) = (Ip ¤
16Ia)(f) = Ia(¹)Ip(¸). Hence, by condition (1) in the Theorem, it follows that I(f) =
Ia(¹)Ip(¸). Similarly, I(g) = Ia(º)Ip(¸). Observe that Ip(¸) > 0, because ¸ 6= 0
and Ip is homogeneous and increasing. Therefore, I(f) ¸ I(g), if and only if,
Ia(¹) ¸ Ia(º), i.e., ¹ ºa º: Axiom (CDOM) is hence satis¯ed.
Finally, any similarity transformation of Ia and Ip also leads to a functional
representing º (with ª being appropriately adjusted), which completes the proof.
¥
Proof of Theorem 2.
Assume that I satis¯es the conditions of Theorem 2. Then, for all f in F, we




(Ip¤Ia)(f)¡(Ia¤Ip)(f) if (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) 6= (Ia ¤ Ip)(f)
°(f) = 1
2 if (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) = (Ia ¤ Ip)(f):
Clearly °(f) belongs to (0;1), is homogenous of degree zero and satis¯es,
I(f) = °(f)(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + (1 ¡ °(f))(Ia ¤ Ip)(f); 8f 2 F:
Furthermore, condition (1) in Theorem 1 and the requirement that ª be increasing
imply that for all f;g in F, such that (Ia(f);Ip(f)) > (Ia(f);Ip(g)), I(f) > I(g),
i.e., condition (ii) of De¯nition 2.2 is satis¯ed. Therefore, if I satis¯es the conditions
of Theorem 2, it can be written as a WCI functional.
Uniqueness up to a similarity transformation of Ia and Ip are proven as in The-
orem 1. The uniqueness of °jff2Fj(Ia¤Ip)(f)6=(Ip¤Ia)(f)g is straightforward.
Conversely, any WCI functional with Ia and Ip, representing respectively ºa and
ºp, obviously satis¯es the conditions imposed on I in Theorem 1. ¥
Proof of Theorem 3.
We ¯rst prove the \only if" part of the Theorem.
By de¯nition, if I is a WCI, there exists a function ° : F ! (0;1) homogeneous
of degree 0, and two homogeneous increasing functions Ia and Ip, which represent
respectively ºa and ºp, such that º can be represented by I(f) = °(f)(Ip¤Ia)(f)+
(1 ¡ °(f))(Ia ¤ Ip)(f). Without loss of generality, we can normalize I such that
I(1) = 1.
The proof goes through three steps.
Claim 1. 8f 2 F such that (Ip¤Ia)(f) 6= (Ia¤Ip)(f), 8µ > 0, 8´ 2 R+, °(µf +´1) =
°(f).
Proof.
For any f 2 F, µ > 0, ´ 2 R+, the homogeneity of I and Axiom (ADD) imply:
I(µf + ´1) = µI(f) + ´. In other words, I is a±ne.
Next, let ¹ 2 Rs
+, µ > 0 and ´ ¸ 0, and de¯ne f¹ 2 F by f¢i = ¹ for all
i 2 K. By de¯nition of Ia, we have Ia(µ¹ + (´;:::;´)) = I(µf¹ + ´1). Because I is
17a±ne, I(µf¹ + ´1) = µI(f¹) + ´. Finally, the de¯nition of Ia implies I(f¹) = Ia(¹).
Therefore, Ia(µ¹ + (´;:::;´)) = µIa(¹) + ´. In other words, Ia : Rn
+ ! R+ is also
a±ne. This in turn implies that for all f 2 F,
(Ia ¤ Ip)(µf + ´1) = Ia(Ip(µf + ´1)) = Ia(µIp(f) + (´;:::;´)) = µ(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) + ´;
where the ¯rst equality follows from the de¯nition of (Ia¤Ip), the second equality is
due to the fact that I and Ip are a±ne, and the last equality follows from the fact
that Ia is a±ne. Therefore, (Ia ¤ Ip) is also a±ne. By a symmetric argument, one
shows that (Ip ¤ Ia) is a±ne, too.
Therefore, we can write:
I(µf + ´1) = °(µf + ´1)(Ip ¤ Ia)(µf + ´1) + (1 ¡ °(µf + ´1))(Ia ¤ Ip)(µf + ´1)
= °(µf + ´1)[µ(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + ´] + (1 ¡ °(µf + ´1))[µ(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) + ´]
= µ[°(µf + ´1)(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + (1 ¡ °(µf + ´1))(Ia ¤ Ip)(f)] + ´:
We can also write, however:
I(µf + ´1) = µI(f) + ´ = µ[°(f)(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + (1 ¡ °(f))(Ia ¤ Ip)(f)] + ´:
Comparing the two expressions of I(µf + ´1), we obtain:
µ[°(f)(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + (1 ¡ °(f))(Ia ¤ Ip)(f)] + ´
= µ[°(µf + ´1)(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + (1 ¡ °(µf + ´1))(Ia ¤ Ip)(f)] + ´:
Assuming (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) 6= (Ia ¤ Ip)(f); this implies °(µf + ´1) = °(f). }
Claim 2. Let f;g 2 F. If (Ia ¤ Ip)(g) = (Ia ¤ Ip)(f), (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) = (Ip ¤ Ia)(g), and
(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) 6= (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) then °(f) = °(g).
Proof.
By Axiom (ADOM), if (Ia¤Ip)(g) = (Ia¤Ip)(f) and (Ip¤Ia)(f) = (Ip¤Ia)(g), then
I(f) = I(g). Therefore: °(f)(Ip ¤Ia)(f)+(1¡°(f))(Ia ¤Ip)(f) = °(g)(Ip ¤Ia)(g)+
(1 ¡ °(g))(Ia ¤ Ip)(g), which implies °(f) = °(g) since (Ia ¤ Ip)(g) = (Ia ¤ Ip)(f),
(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) = (Ip ¤ Ia)(g) and (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) 6= (Ip ¤ Ia)(f). }
Claim 3. Let f;g 2 F. If either (Ia¤Ip)(f) < (Ip¤Ia)(f) and (Ia¤Ip)(g) < (Ip¤Ia)(g),
or (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) > (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) and (Ia ¤ Ip)(g) > (Ip ¤ Ia)(g) then °(f) = °(g).
Proof.
Let f;g 2 F be such that either (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) < (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) and (Ia ¤ Ip)(g) <
(Ip ¤Ia)(g), or (Ia ¤Ip)(f) > (Ip ¤Ia)(f) and (Ia ¤Ip)(g) > (Ip ¤Ia)(g). Let us de¯ne
h by:
h =
(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(f)
(Ip ¤ Ia)(g) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(g)
g+
(Ip ¤ Ia)(g)(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¡ (Ip ¤ Ia)(f)(Ia ¤ Ip)(g)
(Ip ¤ Ia)(g) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(g)
1+´1;
18where ´ > 0 is chosen such that h 2 F.
Because (Ia ¤ Ip) is a±ne, we have:
(Ia ¤ Ip)(h) =
(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(f)
(Ip ¤ Ia)(g) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(g)
(Ia ¤ Ip)(g)
+
(Ip ¤ Ia)(g)(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¡ (Ip ¤ Ia)(f)(Ia ¤ Ip)(g)
(Ip ¤ Ia)(g) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(g)
+ ´
=
(Ip ¤ Ia)(g)(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(f)(Ia ¤ Ip)(g)
(Ip ¤ Ia)(g) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(g)
+ ´
= (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) + ´:
similarly, one can show that (Ip ¤Ia)(h) = (Ip ¤Ia)(f)+´. Therefore, (Ia ¤Ip)(h) 6=
(Ip ¤ Ia)(h) (recall that we assumed (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) 6= (Ip ¤ Ia)(f)). Claim 1 implies
°(h) = °(g). Since either (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) < (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) or (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) > (Ip ¤ Ia)(f),
Claim 2 implies °(f) = °(h). Hence, °(f) = °(g).}
Claim 3 implies that °(f) only depends on the ordering of (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) and
(Ip ¤ Ia)(f), which completes the proof of the \necessary" part of the Theorem.12
We now turn to the \su±ciency" part of the Theorem. Because I is clearly a±ne,
Axiom (ADD) is satis¯ed. We now check axiom (ADOM). Let f;g 2 F be such that
(Ia¤Ip)(f) ¸ (Ia¤Ip)(g) and (Ip¤Ia)(f) ¸ (Ip¤Ia)(g). Two cases may occur: either (i)
f and g are evaluated with the same weights, or (ii) they are evaluated with di®erent
weights. Case (i) arises when [(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¡ (Ip ¤ Ia)(f)][(Ia ¤ Ip)(g) ¡ (Ip ¤ Ia)(g)] ¸
0, whereas case (ii) may arise when [(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¡ (Ip ¤ Ia)(f)][(Ia ¤ Ip)(g) ¡ (Ip ¤ Ia)(g)] <
0. Let us ¯rst consider case (i). Without loss of generality, let us assume that
(Ia ¤Ip)(f) ¸ (Ip ¤Ia)(f). We then have: I(f) = ®(Ip ¤Ia)(f)+(1¡®)(Ia ¤Ip)(f),
and I(f) = ®(Ip¤Ia)(g)+(1¡®)(Ia¤Ip)(g). Because, by assumption, (Ia¤Ip)(f) ¸
(Ia ¤ Ip)(g) and (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¸ (Ip ¤ Ia)(g), we get I(f) ¸ I(g), which implies that
Axiom (ADOM) is satis¯ed.
Consider now case (ii). Without loss of generality, assume that (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) >
(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) and (Ip ¤ Ia)(g) > (Ia ¤ Ip)(g). We then have:
I(f) = ®(Ip¤Ia)(f)+(1¡®)(Ia¤Ip)(f) ¸ ®(Ip¤Ia)(f)+(1¡®)(Ip¤Ia)(f) ¸ (Ip¤Ia)(f);
and:
I(g) = ¯(Ip¤Ia)(g)+(1¡¯)(Ia¤Ip)(g) · ¯(Ip¤Ia)(g)+(1¡¯)(Ip¤Ia)(g) · (Ip¤Ia)(g):
But we have, by assumption, (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¸ (Ip ¤ Ia)(g). Therefore, I(f) ¸ I(g),
which implies that Axiom (ADOM) is satis¯ed. ¥
Proof of Theorem 4.
The \if" part of the Theorem is straightforward. We hence only prove the \only
if" part.
12Uniqueness of ® and ¯ directly follows from Theorem 2.
19Since Axiom (GDOM) is satis¯ed, so is Axiom (ADOM). It follows from Theorem
3 that there exist ®;¯ 2 (0;1), such that:
I(f) =
(
®(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + (1 ¡ ®)(Ia ¤ Ip)(f); if (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¸ (Ip ¤ Ia)(f)
¯ (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + (1 ¡ ¯)(Ia ¤ Ip)(f); if (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¸ (Ia ¤ Ip)(f)
where Ia and Ip are a±ne.
We want to prove that ® = (1 ¡ ¯). Let f 2 F be such that (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) >
(Ip¤Ia)(f). Now, let us de¯ne h as follows: h = ¡f+(Ia¤Ip)(f)1+(Ip¤Ia)(f)1+´1,
where ´ > 0 is chosen such that h 2 F. We can easily check that because (Ia¤Ip) and
(Ip¤Ia) are a±ne (see the proof of Claim 1, Theorem 3), (Ia¤Ip)(h) = (Ip¤Ia)(f)+´
and (Ip¤Ia)(h) = (Ia¤Ip)(f)+´. Therefore, (Ip¤Ia)(h) > (Ia¤Ip)(h), which entails:
I(h) = ¯(Ip ¤ Ia)(h) + (1 ¡ ¯)(Ia ¤ Ip)(h):
Now, de¯ne g 2 F by g = f +´1. We have, because (Ia¤Ip) and (Ip¤Ia) are a±ne:
(Ia ¤ Ip)(g) = (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) + ´ = (Ip ¤ Ia)(h) and (Ip ¤ Ia)(g) = (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + ´ =
(Ia ¤ Ip)(h). Therefore Axiom (GDOM) implies that I(g) = I(h). But because
(Ia ¤ Ip)(g) > (Ip ¤ Ia)(g), we have:
I(g) = ®(Ip ¤ Ia)(g) + (1 ¡ ®)(Ia ¤ Ip)(g) = ®(Ia ¤ Ip)(h) + (1 ¡ ®)(Ip ¤ Ia)(h):
Therefore, we obtain:
¯(Ip ¤ Ia)(h) + (1 ¡ ¯)(Ia ¤ Ip)(h) = ®(Ia ¤ Ip)(h) + (1 ¡ ®)(Ip ¤ Ia)(h): (1)
Finally, because (Ip ¤ Ia)(h) > (Ia ¤ Ip)(h), equation (1) implies ¯ = (1 ¡ ®), which
completes the proof.13 ¥
Proof of Theorem 5.
We ¯rst prove the \only if" part of the Theorem.
Claim 1. I 2 W2 \ W3 and I(f) 6= 1
2(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + 1
2(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) implies that either
(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¸ (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) for all f 2 F, or (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¸ (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) for all f 2 F.
Proof.
Let us assume I 2 W2 \ W3 and I(f) 6= 1
2(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + 1
2(Ia ¤ Ip)(f). In that





, such that, for all f 2 F,
I(f) = ®(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) + (1 ¡ ®)(Ia ¤ Ip)(f); (2)
and it follows from Theorem 4 that:
I(f) = ± minf(Ia ¤ Ip)(f);(Ip ¤ Ia)(f)g+(1¡±)maxf(Ia ¤ Ip)(f);(Ip ¤ Ia)(f)g: (3)
13Uniqueness of ± directly follows from theorem 2.
20Let us assume that there exist f and g in F, such that (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) > (Ip ¤ Ia)(f)
and (Ia¤Ip)(g) < (Ip¤Ia)(g). Using equations (2) and (3), (Ia¤Ip)(f) > (Ip¤Ia)(f)
implies ® = ±, whereas (Ia ¤ Ip)(g) < (Ip ¤ Ia)(g) implies ® = (1 ¡ ±). But we had
assumed that ® 6= 1
2 and ± 6= 1
2, which yields a contradiction. }
Claim 2. If for all f 2 F, (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) · (Ip ¤ Ia)(f), then Ia is the mathematical
expectation with respect to a given probability distribution, or Ip is a generalized
minimum operator.
Proof.
We ¯rst introduce some notations, de¯nitions, and a preliminary result due to
Ghirardato, Klibano® and Marinacci (1998).
We say that two vectors Á = (Á1;:::;Áq) and Ã = (Ã1;:::;Ãq) of Rq are comono-
tonic if for every i;j 2 f1;:::;qg, (Ái ¡ Áj)(Ãi ¡ Ãj) ¸ 0. If there exist ® ¸ 0 and
¯ 2 R such that either Ái = ®Ãi + ¯ for all i, or Ãi = ®Ái + ¯ for all i, or both, we
say that Á and Ã are a±nely related.
A±nely related vectors are important, because the min-of-means functionals are
additive for a±nely related vectors. More precisely, we have the following result,
due to Ghirardato, Klibano® and Marinacci (1998) (Theorem 1 and Lemma 1).
Proposition (Ghirardato, Klibano® and Marinacci (1998))
Let JC denote the min-of-means functional de¯ned on Rq, with respect to the
set of probability measures C. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) Á and Ã in Rq are a±nely related;
(ii) JC(Á + Ã) = JC(Á) + JC(Ã) for all C.
Moreover, for a given C, the following two statements are equivalent:
(iii) JC(Á + Ã) = JC(Á) + JC(Ã);
(iv) (argminp2C p ¢ Á) \ (argminp2C p ¢ Ã) 6= ;.
We can now turn to the proof of the claim. Assume that for all f 2 F, (Ia ¤
Ip)(f) · (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) and that Ip is not a generalized minimum operator. We are
going to show that Ia is then necessarily the mathematical expectation with respect
to a given probability distribution in PS (i.e., CIa is a singleton).
Because Ip is not a generalized minimum operator, for all fi1;:::;ikg µ K,
CIp 6= co(ei1;:::;eik), where for all i 2 K, ei 2 Rn is such that its ith entry is equal





¯ ¯ei = 2 CIp
o
. By construction, K1 6= ;, otherwise we would have
CIp = co(e1;:::;eK). Thus, it is possible to de¯ne ¹ p = maxfp2CIp;i2K1g pi. The ¹ p
parameter represents the largest weight given by elements of CIp to elements of K1:
14If ¸ and ¸0 are two vectors of Rn
+, co(¸;¸0) denotes the convex hull of ¸ and ¸0, i.e., co(¸;¸0) = n
~ ¸ 2 Rn
+
¯
¯ ¯9® 2 [0;1] s.t. ~ ¸ = ®¸ + (1 ¡ ®)¸0
o
.
21We are going to prove that 0 < ¹ p < 1, and construct a vector ¸ such that Ip(¸)
depends on ¹ p.
By de¯nition of K1, any i 2 K1 is such that pi < 1 for any p 2 CIp. Thus, ¹ p < 1.
Furthermore, there exists at least one i 2 K1 and one p 2 CIp such that pi 6= 0
(otherwise we would have CIp = co(ei)i= 2K1). Thus, ¹ p > 0.
Now, consider any j0 in K1 such that there exists ~ p in CIp with ~ pj0 = ¹ p. By
construction, we have ¹ p = maxfp2CIpg pj0. De¯ne ¸ 2 Rn by ¸i = 1 for all i 6= j0,
and ¸j0 = 0: Also de¯ne Cj0 =
n
p 2 CIp jpj0 = ¹ p
o
. Given the de¯nition of ¸, p¢¸ =
(1 ¡ pj0) for any p in CIp and therefore:
arg min
p2CIp
p ¢ ¸ = arg min
p2CIp
(1 ¡ pj0) = arg max
p2CIp
pj0:
But, because ¹ p = maxfp2CIpg pj0, any p 2 argmaxp2CIp pj0 satis¯es pj0 = ¹ p. Thus
we have argminp2CIp p ¢ ¸ µ Cj0.




q ¢ ¹ ¹) \ (arg min
q2CIa
q ¢ ~ ¹) = ;:
As discussed below, this amount to assuming that Ia is not an expectation opera-
tor. Using ¹ p and ¸ we are going to show that such an hypothesis contradicts the
assumption according which (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) · (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) for all f 2 F.
Note that for all µ > 0, argminq2CIa q ¢ ~ ¹ = argminq2CIa q ¢ (µ~ ¹). Let µ > 0 be
such that µ~ ¹¾ > ¹ ¹¾ for all ¾ 2 S, and de¯ne ¹ = µ~ ¹. We have ¹¾ > ¹ ¹¾ for all ¾ 2 S
and (argminq2CIa q ¢ ¹ ¹) \ (argminq2CIa q ¢ ¹) = ;.
Let f 2 F be de¯ned by f¢i = ¹ if i 6= j0, and f¢j0 = ¹ ¹. For all ¾ 2 S, f¾i = ¹¾ if
i 6= j0 and f¾j0 = ¹ ¹¾. Therefore, f¾i = (¹¾ ¡ ¹ ¹¾)¸i + ¹ ¹¾, which means that f¾¢ and
¸ are a±nely related for all ¾ 2 S. Given this fact, the ¯rst part of the Proposition
(i.e., (i) ) (ii)) implies that Ip(f¾¢ + ¸) = Ip(f¾¢) + Ip(¸). Given this equality, the
second part of the proposition (i.e., (iii) ) (iv)) implies that:
(arg min
~ p2CIp
~ p ¢ ¸) \ (arg min
~ p2CIp
~ p ¢ f¾¢) 6= ;:
Thus, given that argminp2CIp p ¢ ¸ µ Cj0, there exists p¤ 2 Cj0 such that Ip(f¾¢) =
p¤ ¢ f¾¢, which implies Ip(f¾¢) = (1 ¡ ¹ p)¹¾ + ¹ p ¹ ¹¾.
Now, let r 2 argmin~ r2CIa ~ r¢Ip(f). We have then, by de¯nition of Ia, (Ia¤Ip)(f) =
r ¢ Ip(f), i.e.,
(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) =
X
¾
r¾ [(1 ¡ ¹ p)¹¾ + ¹ p ¹ ¹¾];
which can be written as:
(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) = (1 ¡ ¹ p)
X
¾




Next, observe that Ia(f¢i) = Ia(¹) for all i 6= j0 and Ia(f¢j0) = Ia(¹ ¹). Furthermore,
given that ¹¾ > ¹ ¹¾ for all ¾ 2 S; we have Ia(¹) > Ia(¹ ¹). But it is easily checked
22that Ia(f¢i) = (Ia(¹) ¡ Ia(¹ ¹))¸i + Ia(¹ ¹); which means that Ia(f) and ¸ are a±nely
related. Therefore, using the same arguments as above, there exists ^ p 2 Cj0 such
that (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) = ^ p ¢ Ia(f) = (1 ¡ ¹ p)Ia(¹) + ¹ pIa(¹ ¹).
Now, by de¯nition of Ia, and since r 2 CIa, we have Ia(f¢i) · r ¢f¢i for all i 2 K.
If none of all these inequalities were strict, we would have r 2 argmin~ r2CIa ~ r ¢ f¢i
for all i 2 K, which would contradict (argminq2CIa q ¢ ¹ ¹) \ (argminq2CIa q ¢ ¹) = ;.
Thus, at least one of these inequalities is strict. This implies (recall that 0 < ¹ p < 1):
(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) = (1 ¡ ¹ p)Ia(¹) + ¹ pIa(¹ ¹) < (1 ¡ ¹ p)(r ¢ ¹) + ¹ p(r ¢ ¹ ¹):
But we have:
(1 ¡ ¹ p)(r ¢ ¹) + ¹ p(r ¢ ¹ ¹) = (1 ¡ ¹ p)
X
¾




= (Ia ¤ Ip)(f);
where the last equality follows from equation (4). Therefore, (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) < (Ia ¤
Ip)(f), a contradiction. Therefore, for all ¹; ¹ ¹ 2 Rs
+, (argminq2CIa q¢¹)\(argminq2CIa q¢
¹ ¹) 6= ;. By the proposition, this implies that Ia is additive on Rs
+, which implies
that Ia is the expectation with respect to a given probability distribution. }
Claim 3. If for all f 2 F, (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¸ (Ip ¤ Ia)(f), then Ip is the mathematical
expectation with respect to a given probability distribution, or Ia is a generalized
minimum operator.
Proof.
By symmetry, the proof is similar to the proof of Claim 2. }
The \only if" part of the Theorem follows from Claims 1 to 3.
We now turn to the \if" part of the Theorem. In what follows, we assume that
I 2 W3.
First, assume that Ia is the mathematical expectation with respect to a given
probability measure q 2 PS. Then, for all f 2 F, Ia(f) = (q ¢ f¢1;:::;q ¢ f¢s) =
P
¾ q¾f¾¢, and therefore (Ip¤Ia)(f) = Ip(
P
¾ q¾f¾¢). On the other hand, (Ia¤Ip)(f) =
q¢Ip(f) =
P
¾ q¾Ip(f¾¢). But any min-of-means functional is concave (see Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989)). Therefore, by Jensen inequality:
P
¾ q¾Ip(f¾¢) · Ip(
P
¾ q¾f¾¢),
and therefore (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) · (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) for all f 2 F, which clearly implies that
I 2 W2.
By symmetry, if Ip is the mathematical expectation with respect to a given
probability measure, the same argument leads to (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¸ (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) for all
f 2 F, which clearly implies that I 2 W2.
Now, assume that Ip is a generalized minimum operator. Then, there exists K0 =
fi1;:::;ikg µ K such that CIp = co(ei)i2K0. In this case, for all f 2 F, and all ¾ 2
23S, Ip(f¾¢) = mini2K0 f¾i. Therefore, (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) = Ia(mini2K0 f1i;:::;mini2K0 fsi).
From which it follows by monotonicity of Ia that for all j 2 K0, (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ·
Ia(f¢j). But (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) = mini2K0 Ia(f¢i). Therefore, there exists j0 2 K0 such that
(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) = Ia(f¢j0). Choosing j = j0, it follows (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) · (Ip ¤ Ia)(f), for all
f 2 F, which implies that I 2 W2.
By symmetry, if Ia is a generalized minimum operator, the same argument leads
to (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¸ (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) for all f 2 F, which clearly implies that I 2 W2.
Finally, if I(f) = 1
2(Ip¤Ia)(f)+ 1
2(Ia¤Ip)(f) for all f 2 F, then trivially I 2 W2.
¥
Proof of Theorem 6.
The \if" part of the Theorem is straightforward. We hence only prove the \only
if" part.
Since I 2 W and I satis¯es Axiom (ADD), Ia and Ip are a±ne.
Let f 2 F, such that (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) 6= (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) and consider g de¯ned by:
g¾i = 1
2Ia(f¢i) + 1
2Ip(f¾¢), for all i in K and all ¾ in S. We then obtain:
Ia(g¢i) = Ia(f¢i) + [
1
2
(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¡
1
2
Ia(f¢i)]; 8i 2 K; (5)
and:
Ip(g¾¢) = Ip(f¾¢) + [
1
2
(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¡
1
2
Ip(f¾¢)]; 8¾ 2 S: (6)
Now, let us de¯ne u 2 Rn by ui = 1
2(Ia(f¢i) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(f)), for all i in K, and
v 2 Rs by v¾ = 1
2((Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¡ Ip(f¾¢)). We hence have: Ia(g) = Ia(f) ¡ u and
Ip(g) = Ip(f) + v. Finally, let k > 0 be large enough to have u¾¢ + k and v¢i + k in
F, where u¾¢ + k (v¢i + k) represents the matrix with all rows (columns) equal to
u + k1n (v + k1s). 15
Without loss of generality, we assume that I is normalized with I(1) = 1. Then,
we can easily check that, since Ia and Ip are a±ne, (Ia¤Ip)(u¾¢+k) = (Ip¤Ia)(u¾¢+
k) = 1
2[(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(f)] + k, which implies, since I is a WCI functional,
that I(u¾¢ + k) = 1
2[(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(f)] + k. Similarly, (Ia ¤ Ip)(v¢i + k) =
(Ip ¤ Ia)(v¢i + k) = 1
2[(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(f)] + k. Therefore, I(v¢i + k) =
1
2[(Ip ¤ Ia)(f) ¡ (Ia ¤ Ip)(f)] + k, from which it follows that I(u¾¢ + k) = I(v¢i + k).
Therefore, v 2 S(u). Hence, by Axiom (SYM), we have f » g. Because Ia and Ip
are a±ne, however, we obtain, using equations (5) and (6):
(Ip ¤ Ia)(g) = (Ip ¤ Ia)(f) +
1
2











15k should be chosen large enough to have (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) ¡ 1
2Ia(f¢i) + k > 0 for all i, and (Ip ¤
Ia)(f) ¡ 1
2Ip(f¾¢) + k > 0 for all ¾.
24and:
(Ia ¤ Ip)(g) = (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) +
1
2











Hence, by Theorem 1, I(g) = 1
2(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) + 1
2(Ip ¤ Ia)(f). Therefore, I(f) = 1
2(Ia ¤
Ip)(f) + 1
2(Ip ¤ Ia)(f). We can then conclude that, for all f such that (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) 6=
(Ip ¤ Ia)(f), °(f) = 1
2.
Finally, if (Ia ¤ Ip)(f) = (Ip ¤ Ia)(f), one obviously get I(f) = 1
2(Ia ¤ Ip)(f) +
1
2(Ip ¤ Ia)(f). ¥
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